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Abstract
Political decision-making involves the presentation of policy options from opposing points of view and in
different lights. We test whether economic policy decisions are subject to equivalency framing by presenting
survey participants with binary risky-choice decisions in hypothetical policy scenarios. Potentially mediating
influences of expertise on the framing effect are explored using responses of students and professionals. Ex-
pertise is thereby defined in line with common education and work experience criteria in the recruitment of
public officials. We mostly find unidirectional framing effects in the economic policy scenarios and a similar
susceptibility of respondents with different levels of expertise. A logistic regression of the expertise variables
on the choice between certain and risky options reveals only the frame to have a systematically significant
effect across scenarios. The results indicate that expertise may not necessarily help to make better policy
choices under risk, if the available options are framed differently.
JEL classifications: D73; D81
Keywords: Equivalency framing; Political decision-making; Economic policy; Expertise
1. Introduction
Political decision-making is inherently based on the convictions of individual actors and their choices.
Voters choose which topics they consider important and whom to elect as their representatives; politicians
choose between alternative policy options and how to react to external events; and public officials again
have to make various choices when providing the operational and informational base of the policy-making
process. The nature of policy-making and the indeterminateness of the future thereby dictate that many of
these choices involve risk. Yet, the actors on the institutional side are expected to be able to consistently
find the best policy options. In democracies the public relies on them to take the ‘right’ decisions because
they are seen as expert decision-makers. Their education, experience, and access to information give them
advantages in their subject areas and in the mechanics of politics (Boswell, 2008; Radaelli, 1999; Strøm,
2000).
This expectation raises two issues: First, it is not always clear what determines expertise and its influ-
ence on the suitability and capacity of political actors (Bendor, 2010; Emler and Frazer, 1999; Krosnick,
1990). Second, a long line of empirical research on decision-making has shown that human choices are more
susceptible to behavioural influences than the popular rational choice theories in political science allow for.
In risky-choice, already small linguistic variations in the presentation of equivalent options can alter decision
outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Levin et al., 2002; see Ku¨hberger, 1998 for a meta-analysis).
In this paper, we ask whether policy-decisions are subject to framing effects, which direction these effects
take, and whether expertise has an influence. Our research is built on Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981, p.453)
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Asian Disease Experiment (ADE), which demonstrates that framing can have a large effect. As a baseline,
the ADE itself is reproduced and we find a similar bidirectional effect as the original study. Because of its
relevance to a broad range of political decisions we also reproduce Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988, p.727)
Employment-Inflation trade-off. While it does not feature any risky choices, it is one of the few questions
so far to specifically test economic policy scenarios for framing effects. Contrary to Quattrone and Tversky
(1988), we do not find a significant effect.
To test framing in economic policy-decisions, we use relevant hypothetical scenarios building on the same
structure as the ADE. A sample of students and professionals is presented with salient issues in (EU) policy-
making. Participants make a binary choice between a risky and a certain option with equivalent outcomes,
in either a positive or a negative frame. Our results show mostly unidirectional framing effects. In the
positive frames of our three scenarios, a significant majority prefers the certain option. This picture changes
in the negative frame: In two scenarios no option is systematically preferred; and in the third scenario the
participants exhibit a weak preference reversal with a smaller majority choosing the risky option.
To explore the potential influence of expertise on the susceptibility to framing, we focus on the criteria
used for the recruitment and evaluation of public officials. To our knowledge, no such attempt has been
made yet. Using logistic regression models, we test the effects of education, experience, and other control
variables on the observed choice behaviour. We find that respondents with high qualification levels and those
without show a similar susceptibility, while the frame is the only variable that is systematically significant
across scenarios. The presented results call for caution when assuming that expertise helps people to make
better policy decisions under risk, if the available options can be framed differently.
2. Literature
Decision-modelling and prediction in economics and political science are traditionally based on rational
choice theories, such as Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947). In economics, behavioural approaches have steadily advanced during the last decades and provide
an increasingly popular alternative to rational choice approaches. Empirical evidence of decision-biases is
well documented in a large literature and is part of the mainstream discourse (Kahneman and Tversky,
2000). Also political scientists criticise the failure of rational choice theories to explain empirical data in
decision-making, a tendency to post-hoc theorising (Green and Shapiro, 1994), and the failure of their mostly
deductive methods to capture the complexities of human decision-making (Simon, 1995).1 Nonetheless,
rational choice still seems to be the preferred tool-kit and dominating paradigm in political science (Peters,
2005; Pollack, 2006). As Schnellenbach and Schubert (2014) point out, the behavioural approach is also
only slowly entering the realms of public choice and political economy.
The gradual evolution of behavioural choice concepts has caused much debate about the normative and
descriptive adequacy of the axioms of rational choice theory. Two of its key assumptions are invariance and
dominance. Invariance dictates that preferences should be independent of the description of the options, as
long as the content is not changed. Dominance requires an option to be preferred over all other options, as
long as it is better in one state and at least as good in all other states. The representation, or framing, of
options given in a problem should thus not have any impact on choice if their outcomes are equivalent. Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1981, 1986) specifically challenge these two axioms after finding numerous deviations
from the predictions of rational choice theories throughout different experiments.
In their well-known Asian Disease Experiment (ADE), participants are told that a rare disease is threat-
ening lives and that they need to choose one of two available response programmes. One option provides a
certain outcome, whereas the other option carries risk by offering two possible outcomes and their respec-
tive probabilities. Both options are mathematically equivalent, but participants receive them either framed
negatively or positively. In the negative frame, the outcome is described by how many people will die if
either programme is chosen, and in the positive frame by how many people will survive. In the original
1However, the available behavioural accounts (e.g. Bounded Rationality) usually face their own problems, such as aggrega-
tion and dynamics (see Harstad and Selten, this issue).
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study, participants chose the risky option when the outcome is framed in terms of ‘deaths’, and the risk-free
option when the outcome is framed in terms of ‘lives saved’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).2
To integrate framing effects and other violations of EUT’s axioms, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) devel-
oped Prospect Theory as their descriptive model of decision-making under risk. It builds on the notion that
decision-makers assess options with respect to a subjective reference point, reacting differently to gains and
losses: individuals are risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses (reflection
effect). Losses also hurt more than gains gratify (loss aversion).3
In the political context, the importance of framing in decision-making under risk received increased
attention when (mostly) international relations researchers started to apply Prospect Theory to explain
the behaviour of governments and individual leaders in crisis situations (see Boettcher, 2004; McDermott,
2004; Mercer, 2005, for reviews). Currently ongoing work expands these efforts by testing Prospect Theory’s
predictions with Members of Parliament from various countries and promises interesting results (Linde and
Vis, 2014; Loewen et al., 2014).
Mercer (2005) suggests that a political actor will commonly see the status-quo as reference point.4 In
this paper we take the same approach as Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and assume that the reference point
and the domains of gain and loss are induced by the scenario description. In more dynamic situations, the
domain an actor sees himself in, would, however, depend to a larger extent on deviations from a pre-existing
or current context. Especially in crisis situations, when most decisions carry risk, an actor’s perceived
domain has the potential to distort his actions. If, for example, the state of a military campaign is perceived
as a loss (be it personnel, strategic influence, reputation, etc.), the propensity to take risks to mitigate the
situation increases (Levy, 1997; Mercer, 2005). When a policy creates benefits that are also perceived as
gains, the willingness to take risks to achieve even better results diminishes (McDermott, 2004).
A political actor could also have a constructed goal, or an aspiration, as a reference point rather than
the status-quo. The actor may envision a specific target result against which reality is then compared. For
instance, the aim of an economic policy reform might be a drop in the unemployment rate from ten percent
to eight percent. A politician basing his next election campaign on achieving this reduction effectively takes
the not yet realised eight percent as reference point. As the reference point is ‘better’ than the current state,
the current state is perceived as a loss. The actor is motivated to take more risk to avoid this ‘loss’ and
disrupt the status-quo (Levy, 2003).
3. Hypotheses
Equivalency framing effects have been confirmed in a large range of studies with diverse alterations to the
experimental settings (e.g. Bless et al., 1998; Druckman, 2001; Ku¨hberger, 1998; Ku¨hberger et al., 1999).5
Frisch (1993) even finds that the effect holds for participants who, on reflection, agree that the two options
should be treated the same. This finding refutes attempts to explain the framing effect by errors based
on misinterpretations of single options. The common criticism that results obtained under laboratory-like
conditions are not applicable to real-world situations (Levy, 1997), is, for example, answered by Bu¨tler and
Mare´chal’s (2007) confirmation of equivalency framing effects in a large scale natural experiment in a Swiss
policy referendum. The hypothetical nature of outcomes in framing questions does not necessarily prohibit
the generalisation of results to real world applications (Wiseman and Levin, 1996). However, the occurrence
of framing effects in ADE-like questions has been found to depend on the task domain (Ku¨hberger et al.,
1999; Ro¨nnlund et al., 2005; Wang, 1996). While some studies replicating the ADE have used employment
2See Appendix A for a reproduction of the Asian Disease Experiment.
3McDermott (1998) provides an in-depth description of Prospect Theory in the political context.
4Equating the status-quo with the reference point seems to be a widely used method for considerations of Prospect Theory
in international relations (McDermott, 1998; Mercer, 2005). It also lends itself as easily operationalisable and sensible approach
for political decision-making. However, the definition of reference points is highly debated and includes, for example, arguments
such as: multiple reference points (Kahneman, 1992; McDermott, 1998), endogeneity (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007), and the
certainty equivalence (Meza and Webb, 2007) and uncertainty of reference points (Schmidt et al., 2008).
5The same cannot necessarily be said of other biases, see, for example, Henrich et al. (2010).
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numbers (e.g Bazerman, 1984), research on equivalency framing in other economic policy scenarios is rare.
Given the broad confirmation from other domains, we expect economic policy scenarios in general to be
subject to framing effects. Our first hypothesis, therefore, is that framing effects as such also occur in
ADE-like questions with economic policy scenarios.
Hypothesis 1: Equivalency framing effects occur in binary economic policy decision problems with
differently risky options.
The risk a political actor chooses to take in a policy decision is largely borne by the population. The
actor’s distance to the direct consequences could potentially lead to a lower weighting of risk. Politicians, of
course, face indirect consequences such as electoral approval, and public officials are subject to supervision
and scrutiny. Nonetheless, the repercussions of single decisions are typically weaker and delayed by nature.
In a loss situation, the appeal of taking a risky gamble could either be expected to increase or to decrease.
On the one hand, the risky gamble offers the chance to minimise any own loss the decision-maker may
perceive (e.g. reputation). In addition, the consequences of loosing the gamble do not directly concern the
decision-maker, but are borne by others. On the other hand, with enough distance, it may be easier to
accept a small loss with certainty than to strain someone else’s luck. In a gain situation the choice to take
or refuse the gamble can also be motivated differently. Either it can be seen as easier to accept the certain
gain without having to strive for a better outcome to the benefit of others, or both options are seen as a
relative gain anyway. If the difference between the gains is not perceived as substantial, the gamble may
be played just as well. In extension, it could be argued that the frames should become less relevant with
increasing distance and the observed choice behaviour should get closer to the predictions of rational choice.
The consistent finding of equivalency framing effects in scenarios with public goods (Wang, 1996), jobs
(Bazerman, 1984), property, social equality (Ku¨hberger et al., 1999), and lives at stake indicates, however,
that distance to personal consequences does not automatically render frames ineffective. The direction of
their effects does shift though.
In replications of the classic life-death scenario, bidirectional framing effects are consistently found
(Druckman, 2001; Ku¨hberger, 1998; Wang, 1996). A bidirectional effect implies that participants reverse
their preferences depending on the frame: in line with Prospect Theory, the majority would choose the
certain option in the positive frame and the risky option in the negative frame. In other scenarios such
as personal property (e.g. money) or public property (e.g. paintings in a museum) unidirectional effects
appear to dominate: respondents lean towards either the certain or the risky option in both frames, but
in one more so than in the other; the majority for the favoured option becomes larger (Wang, 1996). For
example, a shift from 60 percent favouring the risky option in the positive frame to 80 percent favouring
the risky option in the negative frame would constitute a unidirectional effect.
Wang (1996) explains the difference in risk-seeking behaviour between different domains with partici-
pants’ changing aspiration levels. Saving lives is more important to people than money and creates higher
minimum requirements that decision-makers want to see fulfilled, causing them to accept different levels of
risk. Due to the more material nature of the task domain, we would not expect economic policy to create
the same aspiration levels as a life-death scenario. A natural intuition would be that potential effects in
economic policy decisions could be similar to those observed in the public property scenario. The aspiration
level is less dependent on emotional attachment than in a life-death scenario and the distance to the outcome
is large in both domains. In public property scenarios, decision-makers tend to be indifferent between the
risky and certain option in the negative frame, but risk-averse in the positive frame. It is easier to accept
a certain gain than to take a risk to reach an outcome that is already above one’s aspiration level. In our
survey, we would thus expect to find a bidirectional effect for the replication of the ADE (life-death scenario)
and unidirectional effects for the hypothetical economic policy questions.
Hypothesis 2: Framing effects in economic policy scenarios are unidirectional.
In political debates expertise plays an increasingly important role (Rayner, 2003). Politicians can hope
for more support from their constituencies if they are perceived as experts in the policy field in which they
are active. In parliamentary and administrative committees, internal and external experts are asked for
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their evaluations of new proposals and policies (Radaelli, 1999). Public officials are also expected to have
a form of general expertise through their qualifications and experience (Boswell, 2008).6 Experts are not
only passive receivers, but can actively shape the way policy options are framed (Afonso, 2007). Nullmeier
(2005), for example, observes that external experts, such as academics, not only carry their empirical and
normative knowledge into the policy-making process when asked for their opinion, but also their vocabulary
and conceptional tools. The imported language in turn, shapes the proposals considered by decision-makers.
The contrast of different expert opinions for a proposal may be one source of competing frames.
Fiske et al. (1983) argue that experts enjoy cognitive advantages for problem-solving within their respec-
tive fields. They have more information about their task environment and possible action strategies stored
in long-term memory. The available short-term memory capacity is better utilised as existing knowledge is
organised more efficiently and single pieces are well connected. The problem spaces (mental representations
of the environment and content of decision tasks) which they build to process relevant information are more
complex and include more relevant up-front considerations. Lastly, experts have domain-specific heuristics
at their command for issues in their field, whereas non-experts do not. As an example, think of a political
actor facing the highly risky decision whether to support the bail-out of a large, system-relevant bank during
a crisis. He or she would be under immense time pressure, as one could also observe in reality at the start of
the financial crisis. Yet, it is a fair assumption that a systematic analysis of the available information would
at least be attempted. By contrast, a routine problem with far less potentially catastrophic consequences
(e.g. agenda setting, permission granting, procedural decisions, etc.) could be perceived as too mundane
to trigger the effort of full conscious processing. The role of supporting staff in organising information for
political actors further decreases the need for mental work. If the problem is perceived as unimportant,
or ranking lower than more pressing issues, heuristics become more important. The tendency to act ‘from
the gut’ may arise even more for experienced actors (Kahneman, 2003).7 Heuristics can, however, lead to
mistakes such as representativeness, availability, confirmation, and anchoring biases. These biases can be-
come particularly troublesome when they influence judgement about the options which underlie a decision.
With regard to framing, it is unclear how influential these cognitive characteristics actually are. McDermott
(1998), for example, argues that the cognitive capacities of experts are not different enough from those of
novices to influence their reactions to framing.
Based on a meta-analysis of 136 framing studies, Ku¨hberger (1998) suggests, that experts are susceptible
to framing, but may be less so than the student samples used in most framing studies. Who qualifies as an
expert is not fully defined and different studies look at various potential indicators. In the framing literature
aspects such as risk orientations (Kam and Simas, 2010), (in)numeracy (Lawrence, 2010; Peters et al., 2006;
Peters and Levin, 2008), and need-for-cognition (Druckman, 2001; LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003) have been
discussed. Popular measures in the reality of the recruitment of officials, however, focus more on the interest
in political affairs, experience, and education (e.g. European Commission, 2012b).
As the evidence presented in the literature points in different directions, we are not confident in making
any predictions whether experts will be more or less susceptible to framing than novices in our hypothetical
economic policy scenarios. The theoretic foundations of experts’ cognitive capacities do not seem to be well
enough reflected in empirical findings to draw clear conclusions for our research. The literature on expertise
and framing uses measures that do not necessarily capture the reality of the selection of people into expert
roles. We therefore pose the following research question:
Research Question 3: Does expertise reduce equivalency framing effects in economic policy deci-
sions?
Economic policy covers a very extensive field. The design of social welfare systems requires, for example,
other knowledge and considerations than the regulation of the banking sector. The specific knowledge of the
6See Christensen (2015) for a discussion of the different aspects of expert- and generalist-skill based staff selection in large
bureaucracies on the example of the European Commission.
7The use of intuition rather than conscious and effortful reasoning need not necessarily result in poor performance. As
Kahneman (2003) points out, using examples of master chess players and experienced nurses, intuition can be ‘powerful and
accurate’.
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subject, the decision-maker’s ideology and beliefs (Kahan et al., 2013), and the experience from previous
encounters of similar situations (List, 2004) are just a few factors that might influence the responsiveness
to risk and frames. The considerations undertaken in different policy areas are not likely to be consistently
shaped by the same characteristics of respondents. Even if experts are significantly less susceptible to
framing effects than novices, we would not expect the indicators to play a consistent role across problem
scenarios. In a purely explorative advance, and without making any predictions, we look at the significance
of demographic and expertise variables in determining the choice between the risky and the risk-less option
in different economic policy decision-problems.
Research Question 4: Which indicators of expertise have an influence on the choice between risky
and risk-less options in economic policy decisions?
4. Design
We use Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) ADE and three re-phrasings with economic policy scenarios to
test our hypotheses and answer our research questions. Like the ADE, our own scenarios present participants
with the choice between one certain and one risky option. The certain option offers a fixed outcome, while the
risky option contains two possible outcomes and their respective probabilities. The outcome-sizes provided in
the options are chosen to match the scenarios. The probabilities are of moderate size to avoid discrepancies
in their weighting and to match the conditions of the original ADE. Questions are presented in either a
positive or a negative frame with altered linguistic descriptions and mathematically equivalent outcomes
across and within frames. The topics cover a range of economic policies that are common enough in the
public discourse and the media for participants to be aware of. The complete question texts can be found
in Appendix B.
 The Bailout scenario offers participants two different ways to distribute six billion Euro needed as
financial aid to an EU member state. One option offers the repayment/loss of a fixed amount, and the
second option offers two respective probabilities to get either the full amount back or nothing.
 The Trade agreement scenario asks participants to choose between different forms of agreements reg-
ulating the import of materials needed by industry. The options provide either a guaranteed or a
variable level of resource availability and resulting industry turnover based on the type of agreement.
The turnover is given as a positive number in the positive frame and as a shortfall to maximum
capacity in the negative frame.
 The Employment scenario deals with the liberalisation of an unnamed industry with consequences for
jobs. One option includes the loss/saving of a fixed share of jobs, and the other option two respective
probabilities of loosing/saving either all or no jobs.
To evaluate any framing effects against the expertise level of the decision-makers, we collect information
on the demographics of our sample, and on the education, work experience, and interest in relevant subject
areas of our participants. These items are used as independent variables to assess the influence of expertise
on the susceptibility to framing.
4.1. Procedures
Our questions were incorporated in a larger political decision-making survey administered online. All
questions were tested for comprehensibility and structure in a small paper-based pilot (n = 20) before
inclusion. The survey embedded the questions in a European Union context to make the policy issues more
accessible for participants and create a realistic backdrop for the questions with hypothetical scenarios. To
match this set-up, the ADE is reproduced with a minor change of the scenario description from “. . . in the
US . . . ” to “. . . in the EU . . . ”.
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The survey was advertised to political science and economics students at a few European universities8,
spread within the European institutions through personal contacts of the authors, and posted on social
media during spring 2012. After completion of the survey, participation in a random draw lottery to win
a 20 Euro book voucher is available. We do not offer any individual incentives linked to the participants’
choices. Each participant receives each question in one of the two frames and in a randomised order. Always
one of the two offered options needs to be selected, with no possibility to express indifference.9 Individual
questions cannot be avoided without terminating participation in the survey. Participants are assigned to
one of four different conditions containing the possible permutations of the frames.10
5. Results
One hundred and twenty-seven participants (N = 127) answered the complete survey. Tests of normality
revealed that age (in years) and indicators of expertise (years of study, years of work, interest in Economics
/ Politics / EU politics, and attitude towards the EU) are non-normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test:
p < 0.01 for all variables). Consequently, non-parametric test statistics are used where necessary.
5.1. Demographics
The demographics of our sample are summarised in Panel A of Table 1. Most framing experiments
typically use student samples. With the inclusion of professionals as a core feature of this survey, the age
distribution is wider than usual. It ranges from 18 to 54 years of age (median = 25). Sixteen percent
of respondents completed secondary education, 31 percent obtained a Bachelor’s degree, and 41 percent a
Master’s degree. Six percent have finished their PhD. Because the required number of years can differ for
degrees with similar titles across educational systems, years of study at university level is a more reliable
indicator of education. The median respondent spent five years on post-secondary education.
Of the 127 participants, 81 (64 percent) have professional experience with between one and 29 years of
work (median = 3.00). The three largest job groups are academics, economic analysts, and consultants,
together comprising 36 percent of professionals in our sample. Just over six percent are public officials.
Although we are looking at framing in political decision-making, the number of actual officials in our sample
is not decisive. We are interested in the attribution of the capacity to perform better in a task than others.
In the political work environment, this attribution is initially often based on education and work experience.
Participants were therefore asked to indicate the fields of study and work experience they thought would
best qualify someone to solve the problems presented in the survey. Participants could choose up to three
professional areas from a list or provide their own answers.
Table 1: Sample demographics (Panel A) and professions ranked by participants as most qualified to solve the presented
hypothetical economic policy problems (Panel B).
A) Sample Demographics B) Top-5 of Participants’ Ranking of relevant Pro-
fessions
Female 61 percent 1. Economic Analysis
Age (median) 25 years 2. Public Administration (EU)
Years of Study (median) 5 years 3. Finance
Work Experience 64 percent 4. Academia
Highly Relevant Work Experience
(top 3 in Panel B)
22 percent 5. Public Administration (national)
8Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, Germany,
Uppsala University, Sweden.
9See Fagley and Miller (1987) for a study that includes an indifference option. Policy-decisions are very unlikely to leave
the decision-maker the option to express indifference or decline choosing. The omission of this possibility therefore seems
acceptable.
10Always two conditions received the positive frame of a question and the other two received the negative frame. The
responses were subsequently collapsed dependent on the administered frame. Due to an error in the assignment to the different
permutation conditions the respondents were not split in groups of equal size. In the most unequal distribution 40 valid
responses are in one frame and 87 in the other. The randomisation of the questions was not influenced.
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Economic analysts lead the ranking as shown in Panel B of Table 1, followed by public officials, and
financial sector workers. As public officials and politicians are expected to be able to make the ‘right’
decisions and our sample contains a fair share of participants judged to have the same quality, we feel
confident in transferring our findings from our ‘experts’ to the political reality.
Sixty-one percent of the sample are female and 39 percent male.11 Using non-parametric Levene’s tests
(Nordstokke et al., 2011), we find no significant differences among men and women for the distributions of
age and the above listed expertise variables. In studies on behaviour under risk, men are repeatedly found
to be more risk-seeking than women (Byrnes et al., 1999).12 For framing effects the literature is less clear.
When analysing the predisposition of women and men to framing Fagley and Miller (1990) and Frisch (1993)
find women to be more likely to exhibit a framing effect, while Druckman (2001) finds women not to be
more susceptible than men in the ADE.
5.2. Framing effects in the ADE and in economic policy scenarios
Table 2 provides an overview of the choices our participants made. Like Wang (1996), we take the
assumption that risk-neutrality in a between-subject design would lead to a distribution of roughly 50–50
between the risky and certain options as an operational estimate of the risk-neutral reference point. In their
original version of the ADE, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found 72 percent of respondents to prefer the
certain option in the positive frame, but only 22 percent in the negative frame. Our reproduction shows
similar bidirectional effects. Sixty-two and 30 percent of our respondents prefer the certain option in the
positive and negative frame, respectively. In line with the predictions of Prospect Theory, the certain option
is preferred in the positive frame and the risky option in the negative frame. The slightly smaller effect size
in our sample may be a result of the question’s increased publicity.
Table 2: Answers of all respondents to the reproduction of the Asian Disease Experiment and to our own scenarios. Results
are split by frame and given in percentages.
ADE Bailout Trade Employment
Choice P N P N P N P N
Certain 62** 30*** 75*** 35* 70*** 51 78*** 52
Risky 38** 70*** 25*** 65* 30*** 49 22*** 48
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: P = positive frame, N = negative frame; p-values for χ2 goodness-of-fit scores for equal distributions: *p < .10,
**p < .05, ***p < .01.
In all three economic policy questions respondents prefer the certain option in the positive frame, with
75, 70, and 78 percent, respectively. These results near-perfectly match the outcome in the positive frame
of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) ADE. The preference for the certain option again corresponds with
Prospect Theory’s prediction of risk-aversion for gain domains. We use chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for
equal distributions (χ2) throughout the rest of this section to evaluate the significance of the framing effect.
The choices in the positive frames of all three scenarios are significantly different from the operationalised
risk-neutral outcome at the one percent level, clearly indicating risk-aversion. In the negative frame of
the Bailout scenario, 35 percent of respondents prefer the certain option and 65 percent the risky option.
11Most career politicians are still male. Because we look at a broader definition of political actors and use the recruitment
criteria for public officials as our indicators of expertise, the gender distribution in bureaucracies is, however, also relevant. Take
the example of the European Institutions again. The number of women has consistently been rising during the last decades.
By now, 59 percent of the institutional staff in the European Parliament are female. In the Commission around 52 percent of
the total staff are women. While there still is an imbalance for management positions, some Directorate-Generals (DGs) are
closer to equality. In DG Justice, for example, senior management is 50 percent and middle-management 55 percent female
(European Commission, 2012a; European Parliament, 2014).
12Examples include financial decision-making (Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007; Powell and Ansic, 1997) and gambling settings
(Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Levin et al., 1988).
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Respondents thus reversed their preference portraying risk-seeking behaviour (χ2 = 3.60, df = 1, p < .10). In
the Trade (χ2 = .00, df = 1, p > .10) and Employment (χ2 = .10, df = 1, p > .10) scenarios the responses in
the negative frame are not significantly different from a 50–50 distribution. Fifty-one and 52 percent prefer
the certain options, and 49 and 48 percent the risky options, respectively. These results provide support for
our prediction in Hypothesis 1 that framing effects occur in economic policy scenarios.
The results for the Trade and Employment scenarios are in line with our Hypothesis 2, that framing
effects in economic policy scenarios are unidirectional. The Bailout scenario, however, contradicts this
prediction. While the low level of significance in the negative frame calls for some caution, the preference
reversal in this scenario does not allow us to universally categorise the framing effects in our economic policy
scenarios as unidirectional.
5.3. The employment-inflation trade-off
In addition to the ADE-based scenarios, we include an unaltered reproduction of Quattrone and Tversky’s
(1988) Inflation-Employment trade-off in our survey. This question differs from the ADE design. It does not
consider risky-choice, but tests the influence of the ratio of two equivalent changes from different starting
points expressed in absolute terms. A five unit change from a base of five has a different ratio than a
five unit change from a base of 90, but the total change is equivalent. One frame presents a scenario in
which respondents have to chose between two options in which they trade off specified levels of inflation
against either five or ten percent unemployment. The other frame offers participants the same levels of
inflation, but either a 95 or 90 percent employment rate. Under rational choice, the two option sets should
have the same value and should result in the same choice outcome across frames. The frames in this
scenario further stimulate considerations of positive or negative associations with the unit of measurement
in which the outcome is expressed (Levin et al., 2002). A full reproduction of the question is provided
in Appendix A. It was included in our survey because of its relevance with respect to political behaviour.
Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) finding of a framing effect for this type of question constitutes a problem
for rational choice because the changes are unambiguously equivalent and the experimental findings violate
the invariance axiom.
In their original study, Quattrone and Tversky (1988) did not find a significant departure from an equal
distribution in the positive frame. Forty-six percent of their participants preferred the option providing
higher employment (HE) and 54 percent the option providing lower employment (LE). In the positive frame
of our replication we also get numbers close to equal distribution. Higher Employment is favoured by 44
percent, while 56 percent choose LE (χ2 = 1.39, df = 1, p > .10). Quattrone and Tversky (1988), however,
observed a framing effect in the negative frame, where only 36 percent of participants chose the effectively
LE and 64 percent chose HE. We could not replicate this result. In our negative frame 53 percent choose
HE and 47 percent LE (χ2 = .10, df = 1, p > .10). Our participants did thus not significantly depart from a
50–50 distribution in either frame.
This lack of sensitivity to the frames is puzzling. Splitting the sample by gender reveals some small
departures from equal distributions, but they are in opposite directions for men and women. Only the
responses of women in the positive frame are distributed unequally enough to show a marginally significant
framing effect (χ2 = 3.63, df = 1, p < .10). Figure 1 provides a visualisation of the answer patterns of
Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) original study, our complete sample13, and men and women separately.
While the differences in the choices of men and women are not large to begin with, the contrary choice
behaviour, as illustrated by the rotation of the axes in panels c) and d), prevents any framing effect for the
complete sample. We find no clear indication why this is the case. The influence of the linguistic description
on different sample groups in this scenario seems to be more complex than anticipated and warrants further
study. An interesting route to explore in this specific domain may lie in cultural differences and how they
shape the perceptions of unemployment and inflation.14
13Sample sizes are almost identical in our survey (N = 127) and in Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) original study (N = 126).
14We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.
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Figure 1: Response patterns for Quttrone and Tversky’s (1988) original version of the Employment-Inflation trade-off (a),
the full sample in our reproduction (b), and the sample in our reproduction split by gender (c and d).
5.4. The effect of expertise
As a first step in the evaluation of the influence of expertise, we compare participants with at least five
completed years of study at university level15 and at least some work experience against the rest (46.5 and
53.5 percent of the sample, respectively). The framing effects exhibited by the two groups in the economic
policy scenarios are shown in Table 3.
15Five years is the normal duration of studies to obtain a Masters degree in many education systems. As an example, 70
percent of the European Commission staff hold a postgraduate degree on such a level or higher (Kassim et al., 2013).
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Table 3: Comparison of the responses to the three hypothetical economic policy scenarios between participants with high
qualification (at least 5 years of study plus work experience) and the rest of the sample in percentages.
Bailout Trade Employment
Choice P N P N P N
High Qualification
Certain 77*** 25** 77** 41 70* 59
Risky 23*** 75** 23** 59 30* 41
(n = 59) Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Other
Certain 73*** 45 63 59 85*** 46
Risky 27*** 55 37 41 15*** 54
(n = 68) Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: P = positive frame, N = negative frame; p-values for χ2 goodness-of-fit scores for equal distributions: *p < .10,
**p < .05, ***p < .01; df = 1.
 In the Bailout scenario, the highly qualified group shows a significant preference reversal by preferring
the certain option in the positive frame (χ2 = 11.38, df = 1, p < .01), and the risky option in the
negative frame (χ2 = 5.00, df = 1, p < .05). The less qualified group only significantly prefers the
certain option in the positive frame (χ2 = 10.08, df = 1, p < .01).
 In the positive frame of the Trade scenario, the better-qualified group prefers the certain option (χ2 =
6.55, df = 1, p < .05), while the other group does not show a clear preference (χ2 = 1.50, df = 1, p >
.10). In the negative frame, none of the two groups departs significantly from a 50-50 distribution.
 The results for the Employment scenario show a preference for the certain option of both groups in
the positive frame, but not in the negative frame. The effect is only marginally significant for the
better-qualified group (χ2 = 3.20, df = 1, p < .10).
This overview is a first indication that the answer to our Research Question 3 might be that expertise
does not reduce the susceptibility to framing effects. Because the above classification, although common
practice, is arbitrary, we are interested in the specific effects of the individual variables used to determine
expertise. As participants strictly choose between two options in binary questions, the influence of the
individual indicators of expertise is further tested using logistic regression models. A dummy variable for
the choice between certain (= 0) and risky (= 1) options serves as the dependent variable. The frame in
which participants respond is equally coded as dummy variable (positive = 0, negative = 1). To control
for the influence of demographic factors, age and gender are included in the regressions along with the
unweighted16 indicators of expertise17 years of study and years of work, and the interaction terms between
these individual variables and the frame. The coefficients of the regressions are displayed in Table 4 and the
marginal effects in Table 5.
16Running the same regression with the study and work experiences weighted according to the rankings assigned by partici-
pants results in no additional indicators becoming significant. As the coding of the rankings bears the potential to introduce
unexpected errors, only the results obtained with the simple indicators are displayed.
17Including the self-reported interest and attitude ratings in the regression models did not reveal any significant influence.
We consequently decided to omit them from the models reported in Tables 4 and 5.
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Figure 2: Rates of change in probability for the variables years of work (Panel (a)) and age (Panel (b)) for choosing the risky
option in the Bailout scenario fixed on each other and split by frames.
Demographic factors and indicators of expertise vary in their influence. We find very few indicators to
show significant effects at all, and the direction of the effects is not uniform across different scenarios. On
balance, the frame is the single most important influence on the choice between certain and risky options
in all three ADE-like economic policy questions.
In the Bailout scenario, the average participant (age 25 and three years of work) has a predicted
probability of choosing the risky option of 24 percent in the positive frame. A significantly higher predicted
probability of choosing the risky option of 64 percent is seen in the negative frame (adjusted predictions for
margins in both cases with p < 0.01). Age and years of work have significant effects. While the two are
of course highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ = .64; p < .01), their effects go in opposite directions. As can be
seen in Table 5, more work experience reduces the probability of choosing the risky option on average by
about 4.7 percentage points per additional year. Tested for the complete sample the effect is significant,
but not within the individual frames. Higher age increases the probability of choosing the risky option by
about 3.7 percentage points per year. The significant influence of participants’ age on their choices in this
scenario contradicts previously published findings (Mayhorn et al., 2002; Ro¨nnlund et al., 2005).
Figure 2 shows how years of work and age relate to each other. Interestingly, Figure 2a shows that
the peak influence of years of work on choice behaviour shifts from around age 21 in the negative frame to
around age 30 in the positive frame. In Figure 2b it can be seen that the effect of age in dependence of
years of work is higher in the negative frame than in the positive frame. A Mann-Whitney test confirms
the overall effect of age to be only significant in the negative frame (Z = −1.74, p < .10), when participants
have to decide on the form of loss taken for helping another EU member country. With the opposing effect
directions of years of work and age, the frame is overall the most influential variable.
The Bailout scenario strongly relates to current debates and news reports on the political development
of the EU, which may increase its salience. Participants may have different feelings towards the EU with
higher age and work experience, leading to differences in the situational evaluation and changed aspiration
levels. When testing the correlation between age and the attitude rating towards the EU it remains, how-
ever, insignificant (Spearman’s ρ = .05; p > .10). The correlation between years of work and attitude is
also insignificant for the complete sample (Spearman’s ρ = −.06; p > .10). Splitting the sample between
participants with and without work experience (by coding work experience as a dummy variable) reveals a
significant correlation between years of work and attitude for the subgroup with work experience (Spear-
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Table 6: Binary regression results for the restricted model for the Bailout scenario with the sample split by a dummy variable
for work experience.
Risk Dummy Bailout
Work Experience No Yes
log-odds probability log-odds probability
Frame 1.588** .83 1.994*** .88
(.784) (.678)
Age - - .276** .57
(.120)
Years of Work - - -.349** .41
(.143)
Interest Rating .894** .71 - -
Economics (.377)
Attitude - - -.511* .38
EU (.291)
Constant -4.429*** .01 -5.246** .01
(1.633) (2.504)
N 46 81
R2 .252 .367
Notes: Risk dummy: certain = 0, risky = 1; Frame dummy: positive = 0, negative = 1; Significance levels: *p < .10, **p < .05,
***p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.
man’s ρ = −.24; p < .05). Professionals with longer work experience show a more negative attitude towards
the EU and reduced willingness to take risks for the bailout of a member country. To avoid any misinter-
pretations, we rerun the restricted binary regression model specification with the additional interest and
attitude variables in the split sample. The results are reported in Table 6.
For the group with work experience, attitude is now also marginally significant in determining the choice
between the risky and certain option; along with age, years of work, and the frame. Those without work
experience are revealed to be only influenced by the frame and interest in economics. Economists and the
public seem to differ systematically in their thinking (Caplan, 2001; Kirchga¨ssner, 2005). A higher interest in
economics may also indicate a different approach to reasoning in the case of the ADE and ADE-like questions.
Shiloh et al. (2002) find that thinking-style scores predict the susceptibility to framing. They describe people
as predominantly utilising experiential thinking-styles for everyday decisions, but changing towards more
analytic processing if they are motivated to do so. Those with higher interest in economics ratings might be
more motivated by the presented scenarios to engage in rational-analytic thinking. The influence of emotions
on the effect of frames in risky-choice problems in different domains (e.g. life-death or financial) has been
documented by Druckman and McDermott (2008). A more rational way of thinking about a problem could
involve the exclusion of emotional concerns, leading to a reduced feeling of distress. Participants without
practical work experience may be more susceptible to the tone of the general discussion about bailing out
EU member states. Higher interest in economics could, for instance, stimulate the consumption of relevant
(issue-framed) media reports. Such an increased reliance on external sources could lead to an informational
bias, influencing distress and the formation of a risk aspiration level. Professionals have a broader background
to base their aspiration level on, mitigating the influence of the general interest in economics. Despite the
differences in individual indicators, the frame is the only variable that is significant for both groups.
In the Trade scenario, the average participant has a probability of choosing the risky option of 30
percent in the positive frame, and 49 percent in the negative frame (adjusted predictions for margins in
both cases with p < 0.01). Except for the frame, only the years of study variable shows a marginally
significant main effect. Each additional year of study increases the likelihood of choosing the risky option.
The also significant interaction term between frame and gender reveals women to be influenced more by the
frame. The main effect for gender is not significant in the determination of choice between the risky and safe
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options (p > .10), but indicates a slight preference for the risky option. The effect of the interaction term
points in the opposite direction and shows that women are more likely to choose the certain option in the
negative frame. This particular outcome matches the findings of Fagley and Miller (1990) and Frisch (1993).
In general, our results regarding the influence of gender are, however, more in line with the conclusions of
Druckman (2001): It does not seem to have a decisive influence.
The Trade scenario differs from the other economic policy scenarios in two respects. Firstly, it is the only
scenario in which the highly qualified group of participants shows a framing effect, but the less-qualified
group does not. Secondly, the provided options are comparably complex and require more effort to process.
The problem description is more technical and involves specialised terminology (‘rare earths’, ‘industrial
capacity’, etc.). Particularly in the negative frame the outcome is only given as a shortfall of a potential
maximum amount. Participants need to refer to the question itself and perform some simple calculus to
arrive at the amount the trade agreement will bring in industry turnover. A potential explanation for the
absence of a framing effect for the less-qualified group may simply be confusion and random choice. Because
of the relatively high education level of all our participants, this seems unlikely. Yet, for the highly qualified
group, the complex and atypical task may lead to an additional increase in processing effort, conditional
on ability and motivation (Igou and Bless, 2007). When individuals are motivated and the ability to think
about a task is high, more effort does not change the direction of thinking, but increases the extent of
thinking in the direction already given by the frame. A higher level of education also suggests a high level of
motivation to engage with political problems (Emler and Frazer, 1999). It additionally increases the chances
that participants are already familiar with technical and complex problems, reducing the need for in-depth
processing. Simon et al. (2004) argue that the depth of processing, in combination with other attributes,
can influence the susceptibility to framing.
The Employment scenario does not show any indicator other than the frame to be significant in
determining the choice between risky and certain options. The average participant has a probability of
choosing the risky option of 23 percent in the positive frame, and 48 percent in the negative frame (adjusted
predictions for margins in both cases with p < 0.01).
Answering our Research Question 4, the insignificance of the interaction terms between the frame and
indicators of expertise suggests that those criteria do not have a systematic influence on the susceptibility
to framing effects in economic policy scenarios.
6. Discussion
In this paper we successfully reproduce Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian Disease Experiment
(ADE), but do not find a framing effect in Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) Employment-Inflation trade-off.
This lack of a framing effect could be interpreted as failure of the external validity of their findings for samples
that include professionals. However, splitting the sample by gender reveals very slight framing effects, but
men and women seem to be influenced in opposite directions. Because of the distribution of characteristics
in our sample we do not want to exclude the possibility of a distortion in the observed influence of the frame.
Further testing of the scenario would benefit the drawing of any conclusions on its ability to support either
behavioural or rational decision-making theories.
In three ADE-like hypothetical economic policy questions we consistently find framing effects. Two
scenarios cause unidirectional effects and in one scenario participants show preference reversal. Overall, our
results confirm equivalency framing in the economic policy domain and add to the literature challenging the
descriptive validity of rational choice approaches for individual-level decision-making in the political context.
To explore the suggestion of Ku¨hberger (1998) that experts may show weaker framing effects than
novices, we use education, work experience, and self-reported interest-levels as indicators of expertise. Those
attributes are common eligibility criteria for the recruitment of public officials and often used in judging
the suitability of politicians for specific policy areas. As Radaelli (1999) points out, a technocratic decision-
making process relying on the competences of public officials has an important influence on policy-making.
We find effects to differ between scenarios, but highly qualified participants are overall no less susceptible to
framing than novices. In one of the scenarios they show a preference reversal while the less qualified group
does not. In another scenario only the better qualified respondents show a unidirectional framing effect.
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The direction of the framing effects in our results corresponds to the predictions of Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the ADE participants prefer the certain option in the positive frame
(risk-aversion), and the risky option in the negative frame (risk-seeking). In the economic policy questions
the effect fully persists in the positive frame. In the negative frame it is either weaker (Bailout scenario)
or non-existent (Trade and Employment scenarios). Given the assumed operational risk-neutrality at equal
distribution of responses between the certain and risky options, this result would be in line with Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1992) finding that, for moderate probabilities, people are more risk-averse in gain situation,
than they are risk-seeking in loss situations.18 Wang (1996) uses the strength of individual risk preferences
and aspiration levels to explain effect directions. Decision-makers avoid risk in the positive frame because
the certain gain is already higher than the aspiration level created by the task, content, and context. In the
negative frame the perceived deficit between the aspiration level and the outcome causes the participants to
seek risk.
In the life-death scenario, the emotional attachment to the outcome is strong, context factors (such as
moral implications) have a big influence, and the aspiration level is high. People should be saved from death
at all costs, but guaranteed survivors should also not be jeopardised. Both arguments ‘seem right’, but
become more convincing within their respectively corresponding frame. Consequently, the risk preference of
decision-makers is ambiguous and a bi-directional effect results. Wang (1996) suggests that risk preferences
for public property and personal money are less ambiguous and aspiration levels are lower, leading to
unidirectional effects. If the aspiration level is also generally lower for economic policy scenarios, doubtless
gains can easily be accepted. This tendency can be a comforting characteristic for politics. Nonetheless,
it invites questions on the balance between individual-level risk perception and the benefits of risk-taking
in policy-making. In contrast to the life-death scenario, the material loss from a policy decision does not
seem to cause people to systematically take risks. In line with Wang’s (1996, p. 148) argument that “[w]hen
the risk preference is clear, a decision maker would resist a framing manipulation if it is inconsistent with
the existing task-determined preference’s direction”, the results in the negative frames are close, or at least
closer, to the operationally risk-neutral preference.
From a different point of view, Ku¨hberger and Tanner (2010) argue that the incompleteness of the options
in the ADE leads people to infer the unstated consequence of the option. In the negative frame, the certain
option of the ADE states that 400 people will die. Respondents may not solely depend on this salient piece
of information, but weigh it against the logical consequence that 200 people will live. They may also see
the number as a rough and ambiguous estimate (around 400 people will die), whereas the probabilities in
the risky option provide unambiguous outcome sizes (1/3 chance that everyone will die/live and 2/3 chance
everyone will do the opposite). Ku¨hberger and Tanner (2010) find that the complementarity of questions
influences the occurrence of framing effects. Bohm and Lind (1992), on the other hand, produce contrary
findings in a study with Swedish students. They find that a reduction of the number of people affected by
the disease and the full description of outcomes (i.e. the mentioning of the respective numbers of people
dying and being saved) do not eliminate framing effects.
An interesting question for further research in this context is whether the complementarity is interpreted
differently between frames and whether it depends on the aspiration level. In the positive frame, the gain in
the certain option is salient and participants may not invest further effort in inferring alternative statements
of the outcome because their aspiration is satisfied. In the negative frame, the outcome goes against their
preference direction and the difference to the aspiration level may cause individuals to put mental effort into
interpreting the information provided by the options, reducing or eliminating the framing effect.
We also explore the varying influence of demographics and indicators of expertise on decision-making
across scenarios. Indicators are mostly only significant in one scenario each, work in different directions,
and are consistently weaker determinants of choice than the frames. We provide a reconstruction of the
relationships between individual significances and the relevance of the particular indicator to the scenario
based on the existing literature. However, any such post-hoc ‘match-making’ can, of course, only serve as a
18Although Tversky and Kahneman (1992) find the function for decision weights for losses to lie below the weighting function
for gains at moderate and high probabilities (and thus to indicate the higher risk aversion for gains than risk-seeking for losses),
they ultimately argue for the use of equal weighting functions as approximations.
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clue from where to start further research on the reliability of the observed influences of these indicators.
7. Conclusion
While framing research and Prospect Theory have made some advances in the analysis and explanation
of political decision-making, the alleged (although reducing) dislike of methods from psychology (Mercer,
2005) in the political sciences has left the application of behavioural accounts of choice behaviour trailing far
behind other social sciences, especially economics (Schnellenbach and Schubert, 2014). The continued use of
rational choice as favourite tool for normative and prescriptive theories of political decision-making is often
motivated with its advantages in modelling and prediction accuracy. The cost, however, comes with the
blending out of empirical evidence of actual behaviour. Our survey results show that equivalency framing
effects can occur in the decision-making on economic policy issues. This finding opens the floor for many
further questions, but also problems. The creation and influence of frames in policy-making will also depend
on the aggregation of decisions and the dynamics of different processes. In practice not only individuals’
considerations and aspiration levels count, but also a range of other influences. The roles of internal (e.g.
inter-institutional colleagues, auditors, legal examiners, and lawyer-linguists) and external (e.g. lobbyists
and political advisers) actors in the creation and neutralisation of equivalency frames and the process by
which frames are carried through a political discourse call for exploration. Rational-choice accounts are
comparably weak in providing adequate descriptions and explanations of environmental influences on choice
behaviour. Prospect Theory offers more possibilities in this regard, as it allows for varying reference points
and the establishment of context-dependent gain and loss domains (McDermott, 2004).
Cooper and Kovacic (2012) suggest that the feedback mechanisms to limit behavioural biases are not
as elaborate and fast in institutional decision-making as they are, for instance, in firms. Given the lack of
feedback as a reliable way to improve decision-quality, the argument that expert decision-makers might be
less responsive to equivalency framing effects has a strong appeal. The notion of expertise is a fundamental
aspect of the recruitment of public officials and the judging of politicians’ suitability. However, the variables
commonly used for these purposes, which we evaluated in this paper, do not seem to reduce framing effects.
To the contrary, sometimes our ‘experts’ were even more susceptible than the non-experts. This observed
influence of the phrasing of equivalent economic policy options on choice behaviour is a particular cause
for concern when decision-making power is concentrated. When scrutiny is limited, the decision-quality
may be subject to the behavioural biases of few. The links between specific policy areas, task domains,
and individual attributes of decision-makers still offer a lot of ground for further research. The influence of
framing effects throughout the policy-making process and the clarification of the roles other factors such as
institutional rules and culture can play in limiting them deserve attention.
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Appendix A. Reproduced questions
Appendix A.1. Asian disease experiment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p. 453)
Imagine that the [EU] is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill
600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
Positive frame: Negative frame:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be
saved.
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability
that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability
that no people will be saved.
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability
that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that
600 people will die.
Appendix A.2. Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988, p. 727) employment-inflation trade-off
Political decision-making often involves a considerable number of trade-offs. A programme that benefits
one segment of the population may work to the disadvantage of another segment. Policies designed to lead
to higher rates of employment frequently have an adverse effect on inflation. Imagine you were faced with
the decision of adopting one of two economic policies.
Positive frame: Negative frame:
The following table summarizes the alternative
policies and their likely consequences:
The following table summarizes the alternative
policies and their likely consequences:
Employed Inflation
Programme A 90% 12%
Programme B 95% 17%
Unemployed Inflation
Programme A 10% 12%
Programme B 5% 17%
Imagine you were faced with the decision of
adopting programme A or programme B.
Imagine you were faced with the decision of
adopting programme A or programme B.
If programme A is adopted, 90% of the work
force would be employed, while the rate of in-
flation would be 12%.
If programme A is adopted, 10% of the work
force would be unemployed, while the rate of in-
flation would be 12%.
If programme B is adopted, 95% of the work force
would be employed, while the rate of inflation
would be 17%.
If programme B is adopted, 5% of the work force
would be unemployed, while the rate of inflation
would be 17%.
Appendix B. Hypothetical economic policy questions
Appendix B.1. Bailout question
Due to the crisis a member country of the EU needs 6 billion Euro in bailout money. Two different
schemes are available to provide the money, but take different approaches to managing the risk. Which one
would you prefer?
Positive frame: Negative frame:
If plan A is adopted 2 billion will be repaid. If plan A is adopted 4 billion will be lost.
If plan B is adopted there is 1/3 probability that
all will be repaid, and 2/3 probability that noth-
ing will be repaid.
If plan B is adopted there is 2/3 probability that
all will be lost, and 1/3 probability that nothing
will be lost.
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Appendix B.2. Trade agreement question
The negotiations for new trade agreements for rare earths between the EU and China are at a critical
point. China had only recently reduced the export levels for rare earths, but demand in Europe has been
rising constantly. There is industrial capacity to generate turnover anywhere between e0 and e2 billion. Two
different trade agreements are possible, but only one can be implemented. You are part of the responsible
negotiation team and have to take sides for one of the following options:
Positive frame: Negative frame:
If agreement A is signed EU industries will get
rare earths at a fixed annual amount. This will
be enough to produce goods to generate e1 bil-
lion turnover per year.
If agreement A is signed EU industries will get
rare earths at a fixed annual amount. But this
will not be enough to produce goods at full ca-
pacity. The generated turnover will be e1 billion
less than at maximum capacity.
If agreement B is signed EU industries will get
a fixed share of the annual production. There
is a 40% chance that enough will be available to
produce goods worth e1.25 billion per year, and
a 60% chance that supply will only be enough to
generate e833 million.
If agreement B is signed EU industries will get a
fixed share of the annual production. There is a
40% chance that shortages will lead to a turnover
of e750 million less than maximum capacity, and
a 60% chance that e1166 million less than max-
imum will be realised.
Appendix B.3. Employment question
A large industry sector has been run under a state controlled system that kept production at specified
amounts for a long time. The current consensus is that the control of production should be eliminated.
There are concerns about rising unemployment after the abolition of the current system. Two programmes
have been developed to deal with the changes and experts estimated the following outcomes. Choose one of
them.
Positive frame: Negative frame:
If programme A is adopted 2/3 of workers will
keep their jobs.
If programme A is adopted 1/3 of workers will
lose their jobs.
If programme B is adopted there is 2/3 probabil-
ity that all workers will keep their jobs and 1/3
probability that nobody will keep their jobs.
If programme B is adopted there is 1/3 proba-
bility that everybody will lose their jobs and 2/3
probability that nobody will lose their jobs.
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